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Tomer Ezra
Tomer Ezra
Harvard University, Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications
Verified email at cmsa.fas.harvard.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations
M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5119-5126, 2021
812021
Prophet matching with general arrivals
T Ezra, M Feldman, N Gravin, ZG Tang
Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2), 878-898, 2022
75*2022
Fair-share allocations for agents with arbitrary entitlements
M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023
392023
Combinatorial contracts
P Dütting, T Ezra, M Feldman, T Kesselheim
2021 IEEE 62nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2022
272022
On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations
M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 237-255, 2022
232022
Pricing multi-unit markets
T Ezra, M Feldman, T Roughgarden, W Suksompong
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 7 (4), 1-29, 2020
19*2020
Multi-agent contracts
P Dütting, T Ezra, M Feldman, T Kesselheim
Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1311-1324, 2023
172023
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets
T Ezra, M Feldman, O Friedler
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 18 (2), 38-44, 2020
162020
Settling the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with two subadditive buyers
T Ezra, M Feldman, E Neyman, I Talgam-Cohen, M Weinberg
2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019
122019
Prophets and secretaries with overbooking
T Ezra, M Feldman, I Nehama
arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.05094, 2018
112018
General graphs are easier than bipartite graphs: tight bounds for secretary matching
T Ezra, M Feldman, N Gravin, ZG Tang
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 1148-1177, 2022
10*2022
On a competitive secretary problem with deferred selections
T Ezra, M Feldman, R Kupfer
arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.07216, 2020
52020
Prophet inequality with competing agents
T Ezra, M Feldman, R Kupfer
Algorithmic Game Theory: 14th International Symposium, SAGT 2021, Aarhus …, 2021
42021
Prophet inequalities via the expected competitive ratio
T Ezra, S Leonardi, R Reiffenhäuser, M Russo, A Tsigonias-Dimitriadis
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 272-289, 2023
32023
“Who is Next in Line?” On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings
T Ezra, M Feldman, N Gravin, ZG Tang
Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2023
3*2023
The importance of knowing the arrival order in combinatorial Bayesian settings
T Ezra, T Garbuz
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 256-271, 2023
12023
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost
B Berger, T Ezra, M Feldman, F Fusco
arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.01078, 2023
12023
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
J Brustle, J Correa, P Dütting, T Ezra, M Feldman, V Verdugo
arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.11084, 2024
2024
On the (In) approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
T Ezra, M Feldman, M Schlesinger
15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024), 2024
2024
Fair Division with Interdependent Values
G Birmpas, T Ezra, S Leonardi, M Russo
arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.14096, 2023
2023
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Articles 1–20