Ron Lavi
Ron Lavi
University of Bath, UK
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Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming
R Lavi, C Swamy
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 58 (6), 1-24, 2011
Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions
R Lavi, A Mu'Alem, N Nisan
44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003 …, 2003
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
S Dobzinski, R Lavi, N Nisan
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2), 486-503, 2012
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
R Lavi, N Nisan
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 233-241, 2000
Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant‐strategy implementation
S Bikhchandani, S Chatterji, R Lavi, A Mu'alem, N Nisan, A Sen
Econometrica 74 (4), 1109-1132, 2006
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
R Lavi, C Swamy
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 252-261, 2007
Redesigning bitcoin’s fee market
R Lavi, O Sattath, A Zohar
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 10 (1), 1-31, 2022
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
R Lavi, N Nisan
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 45-76, 2015
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
I Ashlagi, S Dobzinski, R Lavi
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 169-176, 2009
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
M Babaioff, R Lavi, E Pavlov
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 56 (1), 1-32, 2009
Position auctions with budgets: Existence and uniqueness
I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 0000102202193517041648, 2010
Online competitive algorithms for maximizing weighted throughput of unit jobs
Y Bartal, FYL Chin, M Chrobak, SPY Fung, W Jawor, R Lavi, J Sgall, ...
STACS 2004: 21st Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science …, 2004
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding.
H Fu, R Kleinberg, R Lavi
EC, 586, 2012
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
M Babaioff, R Lavi, E Pavlov
SODA 6, 1054-1063, 2006
Mechanism design for single-value domains
M Babaioff, R Lavi, E Pavlov
AAAI 5, 241-247, 2005
Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem
R Lavi, A Mu’alem, N Nisan
Social Choice and Welfare 32 (3), 407-423, 2009
A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
R Lavi, M May
Economics Letters 115 (1), 100-103, 2012
Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
R Lavi
Algorithmic Game Theory, 301-329, 2007
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks.
N Alon, M Babaioff, R Karidi, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz
EC, 36, 2012
Job security, stability, and production efficiency
H Fu, RD Kleinberg, R Lavi, R Smorodinsky
Theoretical Economics 12 (1), 1-24, 2017
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Articles 1–20