Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming R Lavi, C Swamy Journal of the ACM (JACM) 58 (6), 1-24, 2011 | 340 | 2011 |

Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions R Lavi, A Mu'Alem, N Nisan 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003 …, 2003 | 305 | 2003 |

Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions R Lavi, N Nisan Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 233-241, 2000 | 276 | 2000 |

Multi-unit auctions with budget limits S Dobzinski, R Lavi, N Nisan Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2), 486-503, 2012 | 275 | 2012 |

Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant‐strategy implementation S Bikhchandani, S Chatterji, R Lavi, A Mu'alem, N Nisan, A Sen Econometrica 74 (4), 1109-1132, 2006 | 256 | 2006 |

Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity R Lavi, C Swamy Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 252-261, 2007 | 136 | 2007 |

Redesigning bitcoin’s fee market R Lavi, O Sattath, A Zohar ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 10 (1), 1-31, 2022 | 119 | 2022 |

Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items R Lavi, N Nisan Journal of Economic Theory 156, 45-76, 2015 | 106 | 2015 |

An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms I Ashlagi, S Dobzinski, R Lavi Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 169-176, 2009 | 83 | 2009 |

Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies M Babaioff, R Lavi, E Pavlov Journal of the ACM (JACM) 56 (1), 1-32, 2009 | 76 | 2009 |

Position auctions with budgets: Existence and uniqueness I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 0000102202193517041648, 2010 | 71 | 2010 |

Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. H Fu, R Kleinberg, R Lavi EC, 586, 2012 | 60 | 2012 |

Mechanism design for single-value domains M Babaioff, R Lavi, E Pavlov AAAI 5, 241-247, 2005 | 60 | 2005 |

Online competitive algorithms for maximizing weighted throughput of unit jobs Y Bartal, FYL Chin, M Chrobak, SPY Fung, W Jawor, R Lavi, J Sgall, ... STACS 2004: 21st Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science …, 2004 | 60 | 2004 |

Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies M Babaioff, R Lavi, E Pavlov SODA 6, 1054-1063, 2006 | 59 | 2006 |

Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem R Lavi, A Mu’alem, N Nisan Social Choice and Welfare 32 (3), 407-423, 2009 | 54 | 2009 |

A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets R Lavi, M May Economics Letters 115 (1), 100-103, 2012 | 44 | 2012 |

Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms R Lavi Algorithmic Game Theory, 301-329, 2007 | 40 | 2007 |

Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. N Alon, M Babaioff, R Karidi, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz EC, 36, 2012 | 28 | 2012 |

Deterministic leader election in programmable matter Y Emek, S Kutten, R Lavi, WK Moses Jr arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.00580, 2019 | 20 | 2019 |