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Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Verified email at cs.technion.ac.il - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4 (3), 1-34, 2016
81*2016
Vertex sparsifiers: New results from old techniques
M Englert, A Gupta, R Krauthgamer, H Racke, I Talgam-Cohen, K Talwar
SIAM Journal on Computing 43 (4), 1239-1262, 2014
802014
Simple versus optimal contracts
P DŁtting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 369-387, 2019
762019
Modularity and greed in double auctions
P DŁtting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation†…, 2014
692014
Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets
M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen
Mathematics of Operations Research 46 (1), 382-403, 2021
54*2021
Supply-limiting mechanisms
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 844-861, 2012
512012
Ad auctions with data
H Fu, P Jordan, M Mahdian, U Nadav, I Talgam-Cohen, S Vassilvitskii
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 168-179, 2012
482012
Strategic classification in the dark
G Ghalme, V Nair, I Eilat, I Talgam-Cohen, N Rosenfeld
International Conference on Machine Learning, 3672-3681, 2021
452021
The complexity of contracts
P Dutting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
SIAM Journal on Computing 50 (1), 211-254, 2021
422021
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021
41*2021
The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.08821, 2016
402016
Approximately optimal mechanism design
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Annual Review of Economics 11, 355-381, 2019
362019
Multiagent evaluation mechanisms
T Alon, M Dobson, A Procaccia, I Talgam-Cohen, J Tucker-Foltz
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1774-1781, 2020
352020
Why prices need algorithms
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Proceedings of the sixteenth acm conference on economics and computation, 19-36, 2015
352015
Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes.
M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen
FAT, 180, 2019
342019
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
Y Babichenko, I Talgam-Cohen, H Xu, K Zabarnyi
Games and Economic Behavior 136, 226-248, 2022
322022
Contracts with private cost per unit-of-effort
T Alon, P DŁtting, I Talgam-Cohen
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 52-69, 2021
282021
Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan
Operations Research 68 (4), 1074-1094, 2020
212020
Bayesian persuasion under ex ante and ex post constraints
Y Babichenko, I Talgam-Cohen, K Zabarnyi
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5127-5134, 2021
162021
Oblivious rounding and the integrality gap
U Feige, M Feldman, I Talgam-Cohen
Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and†…, 2016
162016
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Articles 1–20