Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Verified email at - Homepage
Cited by
Cited by
Vertex sparsifiers: New results from old techniques
M Englert, A Gupta, R Krauthgamer, H Racke, I Talgam-Cohen, K Talwar
SIAM Journal on Computing 43 (4), 1239-1262, 2014
Modularity and greed in double auctions
P Dütting, I Talgam-Cohen, T Roughgarden
Games and Economic Behavior 105, 59-83, 2017
Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4 (3), 1-34, 2016
Supply-limiting mechanisms
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 844-861, 2012
Ad auctions with data
H Fu, P Jordan, M Mahdian, U Nadav, I Talgam-Cohen, S Vassilvitskii
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 168-179, 2012
Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets
M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen
arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.08150, 2017
Simple versus optimal contracts
P Dütting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 369-387, 2019
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021
The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders
A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.08821, 2016
Why prices need algorithms
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Proceedings of the sixteenth acm conference on economics and computation, 19-36, 2015
Multiagent evaluation mechanisms
T Alon, M Dobson, A Procaccia, I Talgam-Cohen, J Tucker-Foltz
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1774-1781, 2020
Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes.
M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen
FAT, 180, 2019
Approximately optimal mechanism design
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
Annual Review of Economics 11, 355-381, 2019
Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan
Operations Research 68 (4), 1074-1094, 2020
Oblivious rounding and the integrality gap
U Feige, M Feldman, I Talgam-Cohen
Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and …, 2016
The complexity of contracts
P Dutting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen
SIAM Journal on Computing 50 (1), 211-254, 2021
Strategic classification in the dark
G Ghalme, V Nair, I Eilat, I Talgam-Cohen, N Rosenfeld
International Conference on Machine Learning, 3672-3681, 2021
Settling the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with two subadditive buyers
T Ezra, M Feldman, E Neyman, I Talgam-Cohen, M Weinberg
2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019
A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
U Feige, I Talgam-Cohen
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 138-149, 2010
Welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium
S Dobzinski, M Feldman, I Talgam-Cohen, O Weinstein
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 300-313, 2015
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