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Yuval Heller
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Observations on cooperation
Y Heller, E Mohlin
Review of Economic Studies 85 (4), 2253-2282, 2018
752018
Overconfidence and diversification
Y Heller
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (1), 134-153, 2014
412014
Biased-belief equilibrium
Y Heller, E Winter
American Economic Review: Microeconomics 12 (2), 1-40, 2020
332020
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
Y Heller, E Mohlin
Games and Economic Behavior 113, 223-247, 2019
322019
Rule rationality
Y Heller, E Winter
International Economic Review 57 (3), 997-1026, 2016
302016
The endowment effect as blessing
S Frenkel, Y Heller, R Teper
International Economic Review 59 (3), 1159-1186, 2017
27*2017
Three steps ahead
Y Heller
Theoretical Economics 10, 203-241, 2015
272015
Justifiable choice
Y Heller
Games and Economic behavior 76 (2), 375-390, 2012
272012
Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
Y Heller
Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2), 394-400, 2010
272010
Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics
S Arigapudi, Y Heller, I Milchtaich
Journal of Economic Theory 197, 105174, 2021
232021
Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria
Y Heller
Journal of Economic Theory 168, 261-286, 2017
162017
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
Y Heller, E Solan, T Tomala
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 222-234, 2011
152011
Social Learning and the Shadow of the Past
Y Heller, E Mohlin
Journal of Economic Theory 177, 426-460, 2018
142018
Heterogeneous noise and stable miscoordination
S Arigapudi, Y Heller, A Schreiber
arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.10301, 2023
13*2023
Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
G Bavly, Y Heller, A Schreiber
Journal of Economic Theory, 2022
132022
Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
Y Heller
Games and Economic Behavior 84, 132-136, 2014
122014
Sequential correlated equilibrium in stopping games
Y Heller
Operations Research 60 (1), 209-224, 2012
122012
Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment
Y Heller
American Economic Review 104 (6), 1857-1863, 2014
102014
Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs
Y Heller, D Sturrock
Journal of Economic Theory 187, 105024, 2020
62020
Stable observable behavior
Y Heller, E Mohlin
62015
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Articles 1–20