Ella Segev
Ella Segev
Verified email at bgu.ac.il - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
P Schweinzer, E Segev
Public Choice 153 (1-2), 69-82, 2012
852012
Defining knowledge in terms of belief: The modal logic perspective
JY Halpern, D Samet, E Segev
The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3), 469-487, 2009
552009
The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
A Heifetz, E Segev
Games and Economic Behavior 49 (1), 117-134, 2004
552004
Social learning and the design of new experience goods
P Feldman, Y Papanastasiou, E Segev
Management Science 65 (4), 1502-1519, 2019
432019
Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
E Segev, A Sela
Social Choice and Welfare 43 (4), 893-923, 2014
422014
Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions
E Segev, A Sela
European Economic Review 70, 371-382, 2014
382014
Crowdsourcing contests
E Segev
European Journal of Operational Research 281 (2), 241-255, 2020
252020
Market design with endogenous preferences
A Heifetz, E Segev, E Talley
Games and Economic Behavior 58 (1), 121-153, 2007
222007
Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts
A Heifetz, E Segev
Mathematical Social Sciences 49 (1), 17-37, 2005
14*2005
Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions
ZC Chen, D Ong, E Segev
European Economic Review 95, 23-37, 2017
132017
Impact of a financial risk-sharing scheme on budget-impact estimations: a game-theoretic approach
A Gavious, D Greenberg, A Hammerman, E Segev
The European Journal of Health Economics 15 (5), 553-561, 2014
122014
On definability in multimodal logic
JY Halpern, D Samet, E Segev
The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3), 451-468, 2009
10*2009
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
R Lavi, E Segev
International Journal of Game Theory 43 (4), 791-819, 2014
52014
Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
E Segev, A Sela
Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 251-261, 2014
52014
Managed trade with imperfect information
G Hochman, E Segev
International Economic Review 51 (1), 187-211, 2010
52010
Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
G Cohensius, E Segev
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018
42018
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals.
O Compte, R Lavi, E Segev
EC, 369, 2012
32012
Managing Congestion when Customers Choose their Service Times: The Important Role of Time Limits
P Feldman, E Segev
Available at SSRN 3424317, 2019
22019
Price Discrimination Based on Buyers’ Purchase History
A Gavious, E Segev
Dynamic Games and Applications 7 (2), 229-265, 2017
2017
LEGISLATION WITH ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES
A HEIFETZ, E SEGEV, E TALLEY
The Handbook of Market Design, 456, 2013
2013
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20