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David Enoch
David Enoch
Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Oxford; Professor of Law and Philosophy, The Hebrew University
Verified email at mail.huji.ac.il - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Taking morality seriously: A defense of robust realism
D Enoch
Oxford University Press, USA, 2011
12142011
Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action
D Enoch
The Philosophical Review 115 (2), 169-198, 2006
5092006
The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it
D Enoch
Philosophical studies 148, 413-438, 2010
2962010
Not just a truthometer: Taking oneself seriously (but not too seriously) in cases of peer disagreement
D Enoch
Mind 119 (476), 953-997, 2010
2302010
Statistical evidence, sensitivity, and the legal value of knowledge
D Enoch, L Spectre, T Fisher
Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (3), 197-224, 2012
2252012
Against public reason
D Enoch
Oxford studies in political philosophy 1 (20), 112-142, 2015
1802015
The case against moral luck
D Enoch, A Marmor
Law & Phil. 26, 405, 2007
1692007
Why idealize?
D Enoch
Ethics 115 (4), 759-787, 2005
1612005
Reason-giving and the law
D Enoch
Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law 1, 1-38, 2011
1522011
A defense of moral deference
D Enoch
The Journal of Philosophy 111 (5), 229-258, 2014
1482014
Shmagency revisited
D Enoch
New waves in metaethics, 208-233, 2011
1482011
How is moral disagreement a problem for realism?
D Enoch
The Journal of Ethics 13, 15-50, 2009
1462009
Authority and Reason‐Giving1
D Enoch
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2), 296-332, 2014
1362014
How are basic belief‐forming methods justified?
D Enoch, J Schechter
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3), 547-579, 2008
1322008
The disorder of public reason
D Enoch
Ethics 124 (1), 141-176, 2013
1172013
An outline of an argument for robust metanormative realism
D Enoch
Oxford studies in metaethics 2 (2007), 21-50, 2007
1042007
Sense and sensitivity: Epistemic and instrumental approaches to statistical evidence
D Enoch, T Fisher
Stan. L. Rev. 67, 557, 2015
1022015
Giving practical reasons
D Enoch
The Philosopher's Imprint 11 (4), 2011
982011
Hypothetical Consent and the Value (s) of Autonomy
D Enoch
Ethics 128 (1), 6-36, 2017
942017
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?
D Enoch
Philosophical Explorations 12 (3), 319-339, 2009
932009
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Articles 1–20